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Evaluating the Impacts of Subsidies on Innovation Activities in Germany 
 
by Reinhard Hujer and Dubravko Radi 
  
 
Innovations are crucial, not only from an individual firm perspective but also from an 
economy wide viewpoint. However, more than any other economic activity, decisions about 
innovations and R&D expenditures are plagued by failures of the market mechanism. 
Innovations represent new knowledge which could be imitated or even stolen by competitors. 
Furthermore, research as well as the development of new products is a risky and uncertain 
undertaking and thus must be financed out of own financial resources or venture capital which 
are both scarce, especially in Germany. As a result of these spillover effects, financial 
constraints, uncertainties and risk aversion, the level of private innovation activities will be 
below the social optimum. 
 
All OECD countries are aware of these problems as well as of the importance of technological 
change and innovations for the future growth. As a response, public instruments have been 
implemented to overcome this dilemma and to stimulate private innovation activities. One of 
the oldest are patents which were already implemented in Germany in 1877. Besides, there 
are various other instruments. Some of them, like competition policy or technology transfer, 
act more indirectly while others, e.g. tax incentive schemes and subsidies, operate in a more 
direct way to induce innovation activities.  
 
This study estimates the microeconomic effects of policy measures on innovation activities of 
German establishments. We will focus on financial measures, like e.g. subsidies, tax 
incentives and public credits. Despite the considerable amount of money spent and tight 
public budgets empirical evidence, especially for Germany, is rather limited. This paper thus 
contributes to the ongoing political debate about the effectiveness of public R&D measures. 
An representative dataset for Germany, the IAB Establishment Panel, is used and various 
microeconometric methods to overcome the inherent sample selection problem applied. 
 
Estimating nonparametrical matching models which accounts for sample selection due to 
observable characteristics points to the view that public subsidies have a positive impact on 
innovations with differences for West and East Germany and different size classes. However, 
we also show that especially with establishment data one has to take sample selection due to 
unobservables into account as well. Estimating a simultaneous probit and a conditional 
difference-in-differences model changed the results dramatically: We only find positive 
effects for East German establishments whereas in all other cases the results are at most 
insignificant. Obviously, public R&D programs subsidize to a large part innovation projects 
which would have been undertaken successfully also in the absence of such subsidies. 
 
  
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 Evaluating the Impacts of Subsidies on
Innovation Activities in Germany¤
Reinhard Hujeryand Dubravko Radićz
May 25, 2005
Abstract
Innovations are a key factor to ensure the competitiveness of establishments as
well as to enhance the growth and wealth of nations. But more than any other eco-
nomic activity, decisions about innovations are plagued by failures of the market
mechanism. As a response, public instruments have been implemented to stimu-
late private innovation activities. The eﬀectiveness of these measures, however, is
ambiguous and calls for an empirical evaluation. In this paper we make use of the
IAB Establishment Panel and apply various microeconometric methods to estimate
the eﬀect of public measures on innovation activities of German establishments. We
ﬁnd that neglecting sample selection due to observable as well as to unobservable
characteristics leads to an overestimation of the treatment eﬀect and that there are
considerable diﬀerences with regard to size class and between West and East German
establishments.
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Innovations are crucial, not only from an individual ﬁrm perspective but also from an econ-
omy wide viewpoint. However, more than any other economic activity, decisions about
innovations and R&D expenditures are plagued by failures of the market mechanism. In-
novations represent new knowledge which could be imitated or even stolen by competitors.
Furthermore, research as well as the development of new products is a risky and uncertain
undertaking and thus must be ﬁnanced out of own ﬁnancial resources or venture capital
which are both scarce, especially in Germany. As a result of these spillover eﬀects, ﬁnan-
cial constraints, uncertainties and risk aversion, the level of private innovation activities
will be below the social optimum.
All OECD countries are aware of these problems as well as of the importance of tech-
nological change and innovations for the future growth. As a response, public instruments
have been implemented to overcome this dilemma and to stimulate private innovation
activities. One of the oldest are patents which were already implemented in Germany in
1877. Besides, there are various other instruments. Some of them, like competition policy
or technology transfer, act more indirectly while others, e.g. tax incentive schemes and
subsidies, operate in a more direct way to induce innovation activities.
In 2000, total R&D spending in Germany amounted to e 49.8 billions. A considerable
fraction was ﬁnanced by the government. The total public R&D expenditures amounted
to e 15.9 billions with e 2.6 billions paid directly to establishments in form of R&D
subsidies.1 The rationale for such measures is to increase the innovation incentives of
establishments by lowering marginal costs of R&D and to decrease uncertainties regarding
planning reliability. In addition to these direct eﬀects at the establishment level, positive
indirect impacts are expected to arise due to spillover eﬀects, e.g. when new technologies
and products diﬀuse and are adopted by other establishments.
However, counteracting eﬀects have to be taken into account as well: At the individual
level it could be the case e.g. that establishments would have undertaken innovation
activities also in the absence of subsidies or that public R&D expenditures only crowd
out private ones. On a more aggregated level subsidized establishments could rule out
1These ﬁgures were taken from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, BMBF (2001). For
an overview of public R&D instruments in Germany we refer to Czarnitzki et. al. (2003) or Fier and
Harhoﬀ (2001).
1non-subsidized ones. The net eﬀect of public R&D policy on innovation activities is thus
not clear cut and calls for an empirical evaluation.
This study estimates the microeconomic eﬀect of policy measures on the innovation
activity of German establishments. We will focus on ﬁnancial measures, like e.g. subsidies,
tax incentives and public credits. Despite the considerable amount of money spent and
tight public budgets empirical evidence, especially for Germany, is rather limited. Table
1 contains a synopsis of studies known to us which all point to the view that public R&D
subsidies have a positive impact on private R&D and innovation activities.2 These studies
diﬀer with regard to the empirical strategy and outcome variable but all make use of the
same dataset, namely the Mannheim Innovation Panel.
Table 1: Microeconometric evaluation studies of public R&D subsidies
Study Sample Outcome-variable Method Result
Czarnitzki (2001) East German establishments, Innovation intensity Selection models Positive
manufacturing industry
Almus & Czarnitzki East German establishments, R&D intensity Matching models Positive
(2002) manufacturing industry
Czarnitzki & Fier German establishments, Innovation intensity Matching models Positive
(2002) service sector
Licht & Stadler German establishments, R&D expenditures Selection models Positive
(2003) manufacturing industry Matching models
This paper adds a new piece of evidence to the ongoing political debate about the
eﬀectiveness of public R&D measures. An alternative representative dataset, namely the
IAB Establishment Panel is used and special attention paid to the problem of sample
selection. In the next section we will present the dataset as well as some ﬁrst descrip-
tive results. Section three addresses the problem of sample selection due to observable
characteristics by estimating matching and probit models. Section four additionally takes
unobservable characteristics into account by employing a simultaneous probit model and
conducting a conditional diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimator. Section ﬁve concludes.
2For an overview of international studies see Klette, Møen, and Griliches (2000) or David, Hall,
and Toole (2000) who surveyed 19 (14) studies on an establishment (sectoral) level from which 10 (12)
revealed a complementary relation between public and private R&D expenditures. Irwin and Klenow
(1996) analyzed the SEMATECH consortium in the American semiconductor industry while Branstetter
and Sakakibara (1998) focused on Japanese research consortia. Lerner (1998) examined the Small Business
Innovation Research Program in the United States while the studies of Griliches and Regev (1999) and
Klette and Møen (1999) analyze the situation in Israel and Norway, respectively.
22 Data, variables and ﬁrst results
The IAB Establishment Panel conducted by the German Federal Employment Oﬃce
started as a reaction to a situation of lacking information about the demand side of the
labor market, at least on the microeconomic level.3 Its population are all ﬁrms employing
at least one employee subject to the compulsory social security scheme. The unit of interest
is the establishment, i.e. the unit where economic activities take place. All establishments
reporting to the German Federal Employment Oﬃce are collected in the establishment
ﬁle from which a stratiﬁed representative sample is drawn. The IAB Panel started in 1993
with 4,365 establishments and an average response rate of 71%. After the ﬁrst wave most
of these establishments were re-examined. Additionally, the dataset was complemented
by ﬁrst time or repeated registered ﬁrms. In 1996, East German establishments were also
included in the panel which in 2001 contained about 17,650 establishments.
The panel is organized in a modular form. There are topics covered annually like
changes in the level and structure of employment, questions about employment policy,
business volume and investment. Other topics are only covered irregularly, e.g. information
about innovations which are latest available for 1999/2000. Additionally, there is also a
special questionnaire about current topics included into the panel every year.
For our analysis we assume a dependency structure according to ﬁgure 1: We focus
on innovation activities of establishments in 1999 and 2000 and analyze whether they
were inﬂuenced by public subsidies granted during the years 1997 and 1998.4 In terms
of the evaluation literature, the innovation decision is the outcome and granted subsidies
the treatment variable. In addition to the treatment variable we also consider a set of
covariates from 1997 and 1998 which might have an impact on the outcome variable. The
treatment variable itself, i.e. the decision whether or not an establishment has received a
subsidy, is assumed to be determined by exogenous variables in 1996.
Keeping this time structure in mind, the sample used for the estimation was con-
structed as follows: In a ﬁrst step we maintained those establishments which participated
3For more details see e.g. Bellmann (1997).
4The time lag allowed between treatment and outcome seems quite short and rules out long term
eﬀects. Unfortunately, information about innovations are latest available for the years 1999/2000 and
questions regarding subsidies granted before 1997 are not comparable with subsidies granted 1997 and
later. As an additional justiﬁcation we refer to Hall, Griliches, and Hausman (1986) who estimated a
dynamic ’knowledge function’ and found that the relationship between patents and R&D is mainly a
contemporaneous one.
3Figure 1: Time and dependency structure
continuously in the panel from 1997 until 2001 yielding a sample size of 5,569 observa-
tions.5 In order to isolate the impact of subsidies granted in 1997/1998, we excluded those
establishments which received a subsidy in 1999/2000 thereby reducing our sample size
to 3,164 establishments.6 Finally, we excluded establishments from the agricultural and
public sector which leaves us with 2,714 observations.
Let us now turn to the precise deﬁnition of the treatment variable, i.e. answer the
question which public measures are considered in this study. Our dataset contains infor-
mation whether establishments received one of the following measures during the years
1997 or 1998:7
– Programs ﬁnanced by the federal government and federal states to enhance the
regional economic structure (”Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen
Wirtschaftsstruktur”) ! 35 subsidized establishments
– Programs ﬁnanced solely by the federal government, e.g. wage subsidies for R&D
personnel ! 77 subsidized establishments
– Programs ﬁnanced by federal states to increase the competitiveness of small and
medium sized enterprises ! 102 subsidized establishments
– Programs ﬁnanced by the European Union ! 55 subsidized establishments
– Tax incentives, e.g. investment subsidies or special depreciation ! 291 subsidized
establishments
5Notice that a questionnaire in year t contains information for year t ¡ 1.
6We were not able to consider public subsidies granted in 1996 because the questionnaire changed
between 1997 and 1998.
7Unfortunately, our dataset contains no information about the amount of R&D subsidies received, i.e.
the treatment intensity.
4– Other programs, e.g. favorable credits from the German Bank for Reconstruction
(”KfW”) or the European Investment Bank (”EIB”) ! 90 subsidized establishments.
Establishments which received at least one of these measures are regarded as treated
establishments. Although an obvious shortcoming of such an aggregation is that we are
not able to disentangle the eﬀects of diﬀerent measures, several reasons argue for such a
proceeding. An obvious one is the necessity to increase the number of observations, e.g.
the number of establishments which received federal funds amounts to 77 thus making
a reliable estimation of the treatment eﬀect diﬃcult.8 Another reason concerns the fact
that a considerable number of establishments received more than one type of measure so
that for these cases an identiﬁcation of the treatment eﬀect of one single measure is not
possible.9 And ﬁnally, since the various measures granted by diﬀerent institutions follow
the same objectives, namely to increase the competitiveness and innovation capacity of
establishments, it makes sense to focus on the total eﬀect of all public subsidies instead
on separate measures.10 Thus, instead of evaluating diﬀerent policy schemes, which might
be of special interest for policy makers, what we actually evaluate is the microeconomic
eﬀect of the German system of R&D subsidies as a whole.
Table 2 contains some basic information about treated and non-treated establishments
in the sample. 2,222 (81.87%) of the 2,714 establishments constitute the control group, i.e.
establishments which have not received a public subsidy in the years 1997-2000, whereas
492 (18.13%) make up the group of treated establishments. 243 of them (8.95%) received
a subsidy only in 1997, 119 (4.38%) only in 1998 and 130 (4.79%) both in 1997 and 1998.
In order to increase the total number of observations we pooled treated establishments in
separate years into one group. Looking at table 2 one can see that the participation rate is
higher among East German (47.52%) than West German establishments (8.22%). Another
feature is the obvious correlation between establishment size and participation rate, e.g.
the participation rate for small and medium sized establishments (SME) with 10-250
employees amounts to 24.36% and rises to 32.79% for the group of large establishments
8This argument becomes more convincing if one considers that we also included industrial and regional
dummies in the estimation which additionally reduces degrees of freedom.
9In our dataset these were 121 (25%) of 492 establishments: 91 received two diﬀerent measures, 24
received three, 5 received four and 1 establishment even ﬁve diﬀerent types of R&D subsidies.
10For an overview of the programs see BMBF & BMWi (2001). A minor point concerns comparability
with the other studies mentioned in table 1 which also aggregated separate measures into one single
treatment variable.
5with more than 250 employees.11 Since most of the programs place a special emphasis on
SME and East German establishments, all of the following estimates will be conducted
separately for these two groups.
Table 2: Basic information about the sample
Treated Controls Participation rate
West German establishments 118 1,435 8.22%
East German establishments 374 787 47.52%
Micro establishments (employees < 10) 143 916 15.61%
SME (10 · employees < 250) 229 940 24.36%
Large establishments (250 · employees) 120 366 32.79%
All establishments 492 2,222 22.14%
Having deﬁned the treatment variable we now turn to the outcome variable. An often
used indicator for innovation activities and therefore the most obvious candidate are ex-
penditures for R&D or R&D personnel. Due to data limitations and several conceptual
considerations, however, we decided to use an alternative concept. As a monetary input
variable, R&D expenditures exhibit a close relation to the innovation process especially in
knowledge intensive sectors. A disadvantage is the fact that especially smaller establish-
ments do not feature a separate R&D department and thus no explicit R&D expenditures
incur. In the case of smaller establishments, innovations are rather generated through
practical experience and as a result R&D expenditures would underestimate innovation
activities. Another issue concerns the input character of R&D expenditures which do not
necessarily reﬂect the success of R&D eﬀorts.12
Since especially new products and services determine the future success and compet-
itiveness of a single ﬁrm as well as the economy as a whole, it is more reasonable to
focus on an output based measure of the innovation process. In addition, most of the
R&D subsidies considered in this paper aim explicitly at encouraging the introduction of
new products and processes.13 Output oriented innovation indicators thus closely reﬂect
11Regarding the deﬁnition of small and medium sized establishment we follow the recommendations of
the Commission of the European Union from 1996.
12For more on this discussion see e.g. Patel and Pavitt (1995).
13For an overview of German programmes see e.g. BMBF & BMWi (2001). In the U.S. the Small Busi-
ness Innovation Research Program e.g. aims to increase private sector commercialization of innovations.
Cf. Wallsten (2000). Unfortunately, again due to data limitations we are not able to follow up process
innovations.
6the intended goals of R&D subsidies in Germany and therefore lend themselves as an
appropriate evaluation criterion.
In particular, we consider an outcome variable which indicates whether establishments
have introduced a new product/service during 1999/2000 (! narrow innovation concept)
and a broader concept which also contains improvements of existing products/services
(! broad innovation concept). The rationale for this second concept is that not only
new products/services but also improved old ones are valued by customers and therefore
might increase competitiveness. Further on, a series of incremental innovations may en-
able radical innovations due to learning eﬀects. And ﬁnally, in slow growing economies
like Germany, continuous improvement may be a more promising strategy than radical
changes.
A ﬁrst and tempting proceeding to assess the impact of public subsidies is to compare
the share of innovative establishments in the group of treated and non treated establish-
ments, respectively. Table 3 contains in the ﬁrst two rows the appropriate ﬁgures. The
share of establishments which improved an already existing product/service or even intro-
duced a new one is 42.30% among subsidized but only 36.19% among non-subsidized es-
tablishments. The corresponding ﬁgures for the narrow innovation concept which excludes
improvements are 27.90% for subsidized and 18.33% for non-subsidized establishments.
In both cases the diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant which points to the view that
subsidies seem to have an innovation enhancing impact.
A simple mean comparison by treatment status, however, will surely not yield an
unbiased estimate of the ”true” treatment eﬀect. To see why look at the remaining ﬁgures
in table 3 which reveal that there are a couple of factors which simultaneously drive
the innovation and the subsidy decision. Examples include the qualiﬁcation structure
of employees, R&D department, R&D cooperations and newer equipment. Not taking
this positive sample selection into account will lead to an upward biased estimate of the
treatment eﬀect. In the following section we will present appropriate estimation strategies
which explicitly account for this sample selection mechanism due to observable covariates.
7Table 3: Mean comparison by treatment and innovation statusa
Variable Treated Controls p-valueb
Broad innovation concept (improvement and new products) 0.42 0.36 0.01
Narrow innovation concept (only new products) 0.28 0.18 0.00
Number of employees 305.68 253.81 0.40
Share of high qualiﬁed employeesc 0.67 0.59 0.00
State of technology (1: Up-to-date, :::, 5: Out-of-date) 2.03 2.12 0.02
R&D department existing 0.22 0.12 0.00
Number of R&D cooperations 0.56 0.29 0.00
Capital company 0.04 0.07 0.00
Competition intensity (1: None, :::, 4: High) 3.48 3.42 0.20
Market concentrationd 0.80 0.82 0.00
East German establishments 0.76 0.35 0.00
Variable Innovatorse Non innovatorse p-valueb
Number of employees 506.39 112.20 0.00
Share of high qualiﬁed employeesc 0.64 0.58 0.00
State of technology (1: Up-to-date, :::, 5: Out-of-date) 2.02 2.16 0.00
R&D department existing 0.28 0.05 0.00
Number of R&D cooperations 0.72 0.11 0.00
Capital company 0.11 0.04 0.00
Competition intensity (1: None, :::, 4: High) 3.56 3.36 0.00
Market concentrationd 0.81 0.82 0.02
East German establishments 0.35 0.48 0.00
a All control variables referring to 1996.
b t-test for continuous and test of equality of proportion for dummy variables.
c Blue and white collar employees for qualiﬁed tasks.
d Gini concentration of business volume for 41 diﬀerent industry sectors.
e Referring to the broad innovation concept.
3 Sample selection on observable covariates
A simple mean comparison by treatment status, which we conducted previously will only
yield an unbiased estimate of the treatment eﬀect if assignment into treatment, D, and
potential outcome, Y , are independent, i.e. Y ?D.14 This independence assumption is
unlikely to hold outside a non-experimental setting but is more likely to be fulﬁlled in our
application if we additionally take a set of covariates, X, into account:
(1) Y ?DjX:
Under this conditional independence assumption, i.e. if sample selection is solely due
to observable covariates, the average treatment eﬀect can be estimated using either para-
14See Rubin (1979).
8metrical or non-parametrical approaches.
The most simple estimation strategy in our application consists in estimating the
following probit model:
(2) Yi =
8
> <
> :
1 if Y ¤
i = ¯0Xi + ¢Di + ²i > 0
0 otherwise,
with Yi indicating the innovation decision of the i-th establishment and Di whether it
received a public subsidy or not.
The interested reader can ﬁnd in the appendix a list of covariates contained in X and
some reasons for their inclusion. We will not present all estimation results but only focus
on the impact of subsidies, i.e. on the parameter estimates for ¢, and some diagnostics
for the models (see table 7 in the appendix).15 To quantify the impact of public subsidies
on innovations, we ﬁrst of all report the marginal eﬀect of D for a reference establishment
according to:
(3)
@Yi
@Di
= ©(b ¯
0Xi + b ¢) ¡ ©(b ¯
0Xi):
Additionally, we also calculate the average treatment eﬀect on the treated given by:
(4) ATE
Probit =
1
N
(
N X
i=1
©(b ¯
0Xi + b ¢) ¡ ©(b ¯
0Xi)
)
;
i.e. the average diﬀerence between the probability that establishments would have intro-
duced innovations if they had received a subsidy and the probability that establishments
would have been innovative under no subsidy.16 The standard error of the marginal eﬀect
as well as the average treatment eﬀect were calculated using the delta method.
For the narrow innovation concept, we ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects for the
pooled estimation as well as for SME and East German establishments. The average
treatment eﬀects range from 6% to 9%. After including also improvements of already
existing products/services into the outcome variable, only the parameter for East German
15Detailed results are available from the authors.
16We adopted the following reference establishment: All continuous variables are assumed to take on
their mean values. Additionally we assume that the representative establishment does not possess a R&D
department, is a private limited company, operates in the transportion/telecommunication sector and
is located in Baden-Wuerttemberg and accordingly in Thuringia for the sub-sample of East German
establishments.
9establishments still remains signiﬁcant (6%). Hence, accounting for observable covariates,
public subsidies seem to increase the probability to introduce new products for SME and
East German establishments.
An alternative estimation strategy to this parametrical approach is the matching
model. Intuitively, a matching estimator tries to ﬁnd in a large group of non-participants
those ”twin” establishments which are similar to the participating ones in all aspects ex-
cept for the fact that they have not received a public subsidy. That being done and if we
can assume that the selection process is only due to observable covariates, the diﬀerence
in the outcome variables between participating and matched not-participating establish-
ments is solely attributable to the program. In that sense matching estimators simulate
an experimental setting.
A practical obstacle of such a proceeding lies in the so called dimensionality problem.
If our vector of covariates X e.g. contains K binary variables, the number of combinations
amounts to 2K. If there are also continuous variables like it is the case in our dataset, it
becomes even more likely that for some combinations of the covariates a mean comparison
cannot be conducted.
As an alternative, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed the concept of propensity
score matching. Deﬁning the propensity score as the conditional probability to participate,
i.e. p(X) = p(D = 1jX), Rosenbaum and Rubin showed that Y ?DjX ) Y ?Djp(X) and
hence one needs not condition on all covariates contained in X but only on the propensity
score p(X). Given this implication, we conducted the following steps in order to estimate
the average treatment eﬀect on the treated:17
1. We estimated the propensity score using a logit model. Additionally to the vari-
ables contained in table 3, we included the squared number of employees, industrial
and regional dummies.18 In order to improve the matching quality we imposed the
so called common support restriction, i.e. we dropped those controls which have a
propensity score lower than the minimum or higher than the maximum propensity
score of the treated establishments and vice versa.
17For more details see e.g. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998).
18We use regional dummies for every federal state. Due to an insuﬃcient number of observations we
only considered 7 industry sectors. Since this model has no behavioral interpretation but only serves to
balance the distribution of the observable covariates, we will not present the estimation results in this
paper. They are, however, available from the authors by request.
102. Using the propensity score we matched treated with non-treated establishments ac-
cording to two diﬀerent protocols: In a ﬁrst step, we conducted nearest neighbor
matching where those non-treated establishments are matched to treated ones with
most similar score. Additionally, we also conducted kernel matching where more than
one non-treated establishment is used as matching partners. Thereby establishments
which are less similar regarding their propensity score are downweighted using the
Gaussian kernel as a weighting function. In order to improve the matching quality
further, in a second step we conditioned on the propensity score and on the industrial
sector.19
3. Finally, we calculated the means of the outcome variables for treated and matched
control establishments. The diﬀerence in the means may serve as an estimator of the
average treatment eﬀect on the treated. The reliability of the matching was checked
by reporting the absolute standardized percentage bias of the covariates before and
after the matching.20
The matching estimator has become the working horse in the evaluation literature, al-
though Angrist (1998) notes that ”the diﬀerences between regression and matching strate-
gies for the estimation of treatment eﬀects are partly cosmetic,” since the approximation
of any functional form imposed by a parametrical model like the probit model and the
conditioning on the propensity score in the matching model become more and more similar
the more interaction terms are included in the estimation.
The appendix contains the detailed estimation results for the matching models as
well as some diagnostics (see tables 8-11). At this point, it is suﬃcient to note that the
previous results are largely conﬁrmed. Indeed, matching yields even larger eﬀects than
the probit model. The estimates are sensitive to the chosen matching algorithm with
larger treatment eﬀects for kernel matching. Note however, that even after the matching
the groups of treated and non-treated West German establishments are still considerably
heterogenous.
19Due to an insuﬃcient number of observations conditioning on the industrial sector was not possible
for diﬀerent size groups.
20The absolute standardized bias was proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and is deﬁned for a
single covariate x as follows: j(x(1) ¡ x(0))=(
p
[var(x(1)) + var(x(0))]=2j where x(1) (var(x(1))) is the
mean (variance) of the covariate in the group of treated and x(0) (var(x(0))) the mean (variance) in the
group of non-treated establishments. The ﬁgures in table 8 were obtained by taking the average over the
covariates. Thus the smaller the bias, the better the match quality.
114 Sample selection on unobservable covariates
In the previous section we have introduced various econometric methods which can be
used to estimate the eﬀect of a treatment on an outcome variable in the presence of
sample selection due to observable covariates. But what if, even after we have balanced
the observable covariates, there are still diﬀerences between these two groups? Or stated
diﬀerently, what if the conditional independence assumption, which is the cornerstone
of the matching as well as the probit estimation, does not hold and hence the sample
selection mechanism is not only due to observable but also to unobservable covariates?
In our application it could be the case e.g. that management ability or corporate culture
play an important role in both determining the innovation behavior and the decision
whether the establishment will successfully apply for a public subsidy or not. In this case
the estimates would still be plagued by a ”hidden” bias, upward we suspect, which could
not be remedied by observable covariates, since both management ability and corporate
culture are hardly quantiﬁable.
In the following we will apply estimation strategies which can be used under these
circumstances. In order to control for a possible endogeneity of D, we will explicitly
model the treatment decision in a simultaneous equation framework:
Y
¤ = ¯
0
1X
0
1 + ¢D + ²1 (5)
D
¤ = ¯
0
2X
0
2 + ²2 (6)
where the latent variables Y ¤ and D¤ are connected with their observable counterparts
via a threshold model, i.e. Y = I(Y ¤ > 0) and D = I(D¤ > 0), respectively.
Note, that equation (6) was estimated to obtain the propensity score for the matching
while equation (5) was estimated as its nonparametrical counterpart. But now we allow
these two equations to be connected with each other via the disturbances, ²1 and ²2, for
which we assume that
(7)
0
@²1
²2
1
A » i:i:d:N(0;§) and § =
0
@1 ½
½ 1
1
A:21
Equations (5) and (6) constitute a simultaneous equation model. Since both of the
dependent variables are binomial, such models are also called mixed simultaneous equation
21Note the necessary normalization of the two probit equations. We have skipped the individual index
for convenience.
12models (MSEM) and since the observable counterpart of the latent endogenous dummy
variable D¤ enters equation (5), the model is of type II.22 Type II MSEM exhibit not only
the usual identiﬁcation problem, which is ensured in our example if one looks at the list
of variables included in X1 (table 6 in the appendix) and X2 (table 3), but additionally
also the so called coherency problem which makes some additional parameter restrictions
necessary. The coherency problem arises since due to the inclusion of dummy endogenous
variables as additional regressors, no explicit reduced form exists. Without going into
detail how to derive these consistency restrictions, it is suﬃcient to notice that a two
equation type II probit model in order to be coherent must feature a recursive structure
between the endogenous variables.23 In our model this restriction is ensured by assuming
that subsidies in 1997/1998 might have an impact on innovations in 1999/2000 but not
vice versa.
The model in (5) and (6) has been estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood as
described in Maddala (1983).24 Due to space limitations we will not present all estimation
results in the paper. Table 12 in the appendix contains the same ﬁgures as for the previous
separate probit estimation. Recall once again that the probit as well as the matching
estimator yielded mostly positive results. However, if we additionally account for sample
selection due to unobservables, the results change dramatically. For the pooled estimation
e.g. using the probit model we found a signiﬁcant average treatment eﬀect on the treated
of 6% for the narrow innovation concept. Now, this eﬀect becomes negative and amounts
to -17%. And the reason for this reversing sign is a positive and signiﬁcant correlation
between the treatment and innovation equation (½ = 0.64). It thus seems that there
are unobservable covariates which have a positive impact on both the subsidy and the
innovation decision and which, if we do not account for them, will lead to an overestimation
of the true treatment eﬀect.
This result can be generalized to the other sub-samples as well. We ﬁnd evidence
that in all cases there is a substantial correlation between the two equations and hence
the previous positive average treatment eﬀects turn out to be overestimated. For small
and medium sized establishments e.g. we now get negative results. The only remarkable
22For a more thorough discussion of mixed simultaneous equation models see Blundell and Smith (1993,
1994). For an application see Hujer, Caliendo, and Radić (2002).
23For details see e.g. Schmidt (1990).
24The estimation was done using STATA. Codes and detailed estimation results are available from the
authors.
13exception are East German establishments. Conditioning only on observable covariates
as we did in the previous section yielded an average treatment eﬀect on the treated of
6% for the broad and 7% for the narrow innovation concept. However, assuming that
public subsidies are still endogenous, we now ﬁnd a negative self selection process due to
unobservables (½ = -0.61/-0.45) and hence the estimated eﬀects even increase to 39% for
the broad and 31% for the narrow innovation concept.
An obvious question at this point concerns the reliability of these results. Having
found convincing evidence for the endogeneity of the treatment decision, the more crucial
question is whether our simultaneous probit model is able to mitigate this endogeneity.
To this aim note that the model contained in equations (5) and (6) may be interpreted as
an instrumental variable approach where the instruments used to model the endogenous
dummy variable D are contained in X2. If one looks at the variables contained in X1 and
X2 which can be found in the tables 6 and 3, one can see that these are by and large
the same exogenous variables. However, the variables contained in (5) refer to the year
1998 while the instruments refer to the year 1996. Our model is thus identiﬁed, but to be
optimal and valid instruments, the exogenous variables in X2 must satisfy the following
two conditions: First, they must be signiﬁcant in the participation equation and second,
they must be insigniﬁcant in the outcome equation.
In the following we conducted an informative test to check the validity of the instru-
ments. In order to check whether X2 is informative for D, we estimated a simple probit
with D as the dependent and X2 as the independent variables and conducted a LR-test
for the overall signiﬁcance of X2. In a second step we tested whether X2 has any explana-
tory power for the outcome equation by estimating a probit with Y as the dependent
and X1 and X2 as the independent variables. Again we conducted a LR-test for the joint
signiﬁcance of X2.25
Table 4 contains the results of these LR-tests and although this is just an intuitive
test, we ﬁnd convincing support for the validity of our instruments. Only for micro estab-
lishments using the broad innovation concept as the outcome variable, the instruments
have also explanatory power in the outcome equation and thus may still be correlated with
the error term. In all other cases, however, they are highly signiﬁcant in the participation
25For a similar approach see Evans and Schwab (1995). This test is only an informal test because in
the presence of endogenous regressors we would have to apply again a simultaneous estimator.
14but insigniﬁcant in the outcome equation.
Table 4: Validity test for the instruments
Broad innovation concept Narrow innovation concept
Equation Â2-value p-value Â2-value p-value
All establishments Participation 31.64 0.00 31.64 0.00
Outcome 4.34 0.63 7.07 0.31
West Germany Participation 10.42 0.11 10.42 0.11
Outcome 2.47 0.87 8.47 0.21
East Germany Participation 29.42 0.00 29.42 0.00
Outcome 5.44 0.49 8.59 0.20
Micro establishments Participation 14.64 0.02 14.64 0.02
Outcome 11.63 0.07 6.95 0.33
SME Participation 18.93 0.00 18.93 0.00
Outcome 2.67 0.85 6.83 0.34
Nonparametrical crosscheck
Our access to longitudinal data is limited. In particular we do not have regular informa-
tion on the outcome decision. The foregoing time period for which such information is
available refers to 1996/1997 and hence overlaps with the treatment period. The following
considerations must therefore be treated with caution. An often used empirical strategy in
the presence of individual speciﬁc but unobservable eﬀects is the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimator.26 This estimator takes the diﬀerence of the change in the outcome variable
after, i.e. 1999/2000, and before the treatment period, i.e. 1996/1997, between treated
and non-treated establishments and thus cancels out any individual speciﬁc unobservable
eﬀects:
(8) ¢
DID = E
£¡
Y
T
after ¡ Y
T
before
¢
¡
¡
Y
C
after ¡ Y
C
before
¢¤
where Y T (Y C) stands for the outcome variable of treated (non-treated) establishments
and the subscript denotes the time period.
An extension which also takes sample selection due to observables into account is the
conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator which replaces the expression for the non-
26For more details see Meyer (1995).
15treated establishments
¡
Y C
after ¡ Y C
before
¢
by its matched counterpart.27 The following table
5 contains the corresponding estimation results. The estimation was conducted conditional
on the same propensity score as previously and by using an one-to-one and Gaussian kernel
matching approach, respectively.
Table 5: Conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator (in %)
Broad innovation concept Narrow innovation concept
One-to-one Kernel One-to-one Kernel
All establishments -2.27 (4.65) 0.87 (3.59) 4.44 (4.81) 4.56 (3.91)
West Germany 2.06 (8.80) 2.58 (5.83) 1.01 (11.54) 8.75 (6.74)
East Germany -2.84 (5.99) 1.55 (3.90) -3.78 (5.71) 2.94 (3.53)
Micro establishments -2.98 (7.65) -1.77 (5.91) -5.25 (7.30) 1.42 (4.74)
SME 9.84 (7.05) 4.98 (5.28) 9.33 (6.27) 8.58 (5.74)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
The results reveal that in most of the cases, except for small and medium sized estab-
lishments where we found a weak signiﬁcant and positive impact, the average treatment
eﬀect on the treated is insigniﬁcant. We once again repeat that these results have to be
treated with caution since due to data limitations the treatment period overlaps with the
pre-treatment outcome period, but we also ﬁnd support for our previous empirical ﬁnd-
ings, where the estimated treatment eﬀects turned out to be insigniﬁcant or even negative
if we additionally condition on unobservable factors.
5 Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to add another piece of evidence to the ongoing political
’evergreen’ debate about the necessity to reduce public deﬁcits by decreasing public sub-
sidies. Although there is broad consensus about this point, the dispute which programs
should be cut down is much more controversial. An often raised objection in this context
is that public R&D subsidies should be excluded from this reduction since they are help-
ful to stimulate technological change and innovations. Despite the considerable amount
spent in this area, the number of evaluation studies which try to assess the impact of such
programs is rather limited.
27See Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) and for an application Hujer, Caliendo and Radić
(2001).
16In this paper we applied various microeconometric methods to overcome the inherent
sample selection problem in estimating the eﬀect of public subsidies on the innovation
capacity of German establishments. In contrast to other studies which analyze the rela-
tion between private and public R&D activities, we used an output oriented innovation
concept, namely new products and services. Such a concept closely resembles the intended
goals of most of the R&D programs in Germany. We started with a simple mean compar-
ison which yielded signiﬁcant positive impacts. We then accounted for sample selection
due to observable characteristics by employing a parametrical multivariate probit and a
nonparametrical matching estimator. The result was a reduction in the eﬀects which, how-
ever, still pointed to the view that public subsidies have a positive impact on innovations
with diﬀerences for West and East Germany and diﬀerent size classes.
Finally, we were able to show that especially with establishment data one has to take
sample selection due to unobservables into account as well. Estimating a simultaneous
probit and a conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model changed the results dramatically:
We only ﬁnd positive eﬀects for East German establishments whereas in all other cases
the results are at most insigniﬁcant. Obviously, public R&D programs subsidize to a
large part innovation projects which would have been undertaken successfully also in the
absence of such subsidies. Another upshot of all the estimation is the following: The more
observable and unobservable factors one takes into account in order to make treated and
control establishments more comparable, i.e. the better our understanding of the sample
selection process, the smaller the estimated treatment eﬀect of subsidies on innovations
becomes.
Of course we are aware that there are several limitations and drawbacks of our study
which have to be taken into account. In this paper we have only considered one kind of
heterogeneity, namely with regard to West and East Germany and regarding diﬀerent size
classes. However, it could be the case that diﬀerent measures have a diﬀerent treatment
eﬀect and hence a multiple treatment framework would be more appropriate.28 Another
point concerns the assumed time structure. In this study we were forced to abstract from
the possibility that there might be more variable lag structures. Additionally, it might also
be the case that diﬀerent ”dosing schemes”, i.e. the fact whether establishments received a
28See e.g. Lechner (2002). Note, however, that limitations in the number of observations hindered us
to conduct such an analysis.
17subsidy only once or more times, might have a diﬀerent impact on the outcome variable.
One also has to keep in mind that a microeconometric evaluation like this one is only a
ﬁrst step to evaluate the total net eﬀect of public subsidies on innovation activities. Only
in the absence of spillover eﬀects, these microeconomic results can be generalized to the
whole economy. Despite all these caveats, we think that it is justiﬁed to close with the
following quote of Lichtenberg (1984) who also found, after accounting for unobservable
heterogeneity, unsatisfactory impacts of public R&D subsidies for the United States and
claims that: ”These ﬁndings thus make heavier the burden of proof on those who would
claim that federal contract R&D makes a positive contribution to aggregate technical
progress.”
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22A Variables used for the outcome equation
There is a vast literature about the determinants of innovations.29 A useful classiﬁcation
is a diﬀerentiation between market and ﬁrm speciﬁc factors. Market factors include e.g.
the competition intensity, market concentration, exposure to international trade but also
demand factors, like proﬁtability and expected development of the business volume which
are all expected to have an innovation enhancing impact (see also table 6).
Firm speciﬁc factors on their part can be further split into internal and external tech-
nological capabilities. The idea behind this classiﬁcation is the following: Industry sectors
are characterized by diﬀering technological opportunities which have also an impact on
the innovation behavior of individual establishments. Additionally, innovations can be
boosted if establishments co-operate with other institutions. However, in order to beneﬁt
from such external co-operations, there must be some technological expertise within the
establishment. External technological capabilities may be captured by variables indicating
R&D cooperations with other institutions like universities. Internal technological capabil-
ities include e.g. the state of technology, the existence of a R&D department, the share
of high qualiﬁed employees and employees devoted to R&D. Other ﬁrm speciﬁc factors
which were also included in the estimation are the size of establishments measured by the
number and squared number of employees, industrial and regional dummies.
Table 6: Variables used for the estimation of the outcome equation
Variable Mean SE
Competition intensity in 1998 (1 = No pressure, ..., 4 = High pressure) 3.43 0.83
Gini concentration of business volume in 1998 0.82 0.06
Export share in 1998 6.05 16.85
State of technology used in 1998 (1 = Up-to-date, ..., 5 = Out-of-date) 2.12 0.79
R&D department existing 0.14 0.35
Share of high qualiﬁed employees in 1998 0.62 0.42
Number of R&D co-operations 0.34 0.99
Number of employees in 1998 252 1,174
Share of one man businesses 0.33 0.47
Share of establishments organized as a business partnership 0.10 0.29
Share of private limited companies 0.39 0.49
Share of capital companies 0.07 0.25
Business development in 1998 (1 = Very good, ..., 5 = Insuﬃcient) 1.98 0.72
29For an overview see e.g. Cohen (1998).
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24Table 8: Some matching diagnostics
Dropped establishments Absolute standardized bias of
due to common support (%) observable covariates (%)
Treated Controls Before After matchinga
All establishments 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.05 0.15
West Germany 0.24 0.15 0.28 0.12 0.11
East Germany 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.07 0.16
Micro establishments 0.08 0.21 0.17 0.08 n.a.b
SME 0.18 0.31 0.18 0.07 n.a.b
Large establishments 0.44 0.43 0.21 0.20 n.a.b
a One-to-one matching with replacement conditional on the propensity score
and additionally on the industry sector (second column).
b Conditioning on the industrial sector not possible due to an insuﬃcient
number of observations.
Table 9: Matching estimator of the average treatment eﬀect of the treated
All establishments
Broad innovation concept Narrow innovation concept
ATE SE t-value ATE SE t-value
One-to-one matching 0.05 0.04 1.16 0.11 0.04 2.97
Conditional one-to-one 0.07 0.04 1.66 0.12 0.04 3.12
Kernel matching 0.06 0.03 1.92 0.11 0.02 5.38
Conditional kernel 0.08 0.03 2.70 0.12 0.03 4.29
25Table 10: Matching estimator of the average treatment eﬀect of the treated
West German establishments
Broad innovation concept Narrow innovation concept
ATE SE t-value ATE SE t-value
One-to-one matching 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.10 0.08 1.25
Conditional one-to-one 0.18 0.09 2.04 0.21 0.08 2.67
Kernel matching 0.09 0.05 1.72 0.17 0.06 2.71
Conditional kernel 0.15 0.07 2.29 0.17 0.07 2.26
East German establishments
Broad innovation concept Narrow innovation concept
ATE SE t-value ATE SE t-value
One-to-one matching 0.02 0.05 0.35 0.06 0.04 1.29
Conditional one-to-one 0.11 0.05 2.29 0.12 0.04 2.82
Kernel matching 0.09 0.03 3.33 0.11 0.03 3.67
Conditional kernel 0.11 0.04 2.89 0.12 0.03 3.99
Table 11: Matching estimator of the average treatment eﬀect of the treated
Micro establishments
Broad innovation concept Narrow innovation concept
ATE SE t-value ATE SE t-value
One-to-one matching 0.05 0.07 0.83 0.04 0.06 0.74
Kernel matching 0.09 0.05 1.97 0.10 0.05 2.13
Small and medium establishments
Broad innovation concept Narrow innovation concept
ATE SE t-value ATE SE t-value
One-to-one matching 0.16 0.06 2.70 0.17 0.05 3.40
Kernel matching 0.07 0.04 1.94 0.14 0.04 3.19
Large establishments
Broad innovation concept Narrow innovation concept
ATE SE t-value ATE SE t-value
One-to-one matching -0.18 0.12 -1.58 0.01 0.11 0.12
Kernel matching -0.08 0.08 -1.10 0.07 0.08 0.88
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